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IF WE HAVE AN IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION,
SHOULD WE SETTLE FOR REMARKABLY
TIMID REFORM? REFLECTIONS GENERATED
BY THE GENERAL PHENOMENON OF ―TEA
PARTY CONSTITUTIONALISM‖ AND RANDY
BARNETT’S PARTICULAR PROPOSAL FOR A
―REPEAL AMENDMENT‖ DESIGNED TO REIN
IN AN OVERREACHING CONGRESS
Sanford Levinson
There is, of course, no single template for ―Tea Party Constitutionalism,‖ given that it is a large, somewhat inchoate movement that inevitably
contains different, often conflicting, strains. As someone from Texas, I am
tempted to focus on some of the more extreme ideas associated with various
politicians wishing to take advantage of the anger projected by many Tea
Partiers toward the national government. Thus at least two candidates for
the 2010 Republican nomination for the Texas governorship (including the
ultimately successful incumbent, Rick Perry) endorsed or at least flirted
with nineteenth century ideas of ―nullification‖ and even secession as a potential response to what is perceived as an overreaching national government.1
More striking, presumably, was the proclamation by the
(unsuccessful) Republican candidate for the Senate from Nevada, Sharron
Angle: ―Our Founding Fathers, they put that Second Amendment in [the
Constitution] for a good reason, and that was for the people to protect themselves against a tyrannical government . . . . In fact, Thomas Jefferson said
it’s good for a country to have a revolution every 20 years. I hope that’s not
where we’re going, but you know, if this Congress keeps going the way it
is, people are really looking toward those Second Amendment remedies.‖2
W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas
Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin (link). This is a version of remarks initially presented at a panel on ―Tea Party Constitutionalism‖ organized by Professor Richard
Albert for the 2011 meetings of the AALS in San Francisco. It was an excellent panel, and I regret only
that it was held at the Hilton Hotel.
1
See Sanford Levinson, Commentary: States Can’t Nullify Federal Law, AUSTIN AMERICAN–
STATESMAN, Feb. 7, 2010, http://www.statesman.com/opinion/insight/commentary-states-can-t-nullifyfederal-law-217250.html (link).
2
Anjeanette Damon & David McGrath Schwartz, Nev. Senate Hopeful Sharron Angle Talks of
Armed Revolt, SCRIPPSNEWS, June 17, 2010, http://www.scrippsnews.com/content/nev-senate-hopefulsharron-angle-talks-armed-revolt (internal quotation marks omitted) (link).
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But, to paraphrase former President Richard M. Nixon, it ―would be
wrong‖ to dwell on such almost-certainly unrepresentative, albeit prominent, public figures who have avidly promoted and embraced the ―Tea Party
moment‖ of our contemporary polity.
I have no doubt that my good friend Randy Barnett3 is far more typical
of the median Tea Party constitutionalist, even if he is (somewhat) less
prominent than, say, Ms. Angle or Governor Rick Perry. So I hope it suffices, for purposes of these comments, to focus on his own particular support for what he calls ―the Repeal Amendment,‖ which he believes would
offer a temperate path toward reining in the possibly overweening national
government. The proposal would allow the legislatures of two-thirds of all
states to repeal any congressional legislation.4 The New York Times accurately quoted me as describing this proposal as ―a really terrible idea.‖5 I
want to take this opportunity to elaborate why I consider this to be the case,
though, paradoxically or not, I also think that the proposal is also remarkably timid, in some ways not worth getting excited about. This is because it
is so spectacularly unlikely to be truly efficacious in achieving the goals
Professor Barnett is striving for, namely returning our polity to a presumed
―good old days‖ when the national government was far more limited in its
conception of what it could do. Those who share Professor Barnett’s basic
fears about the national government ought to be far more concerned about
his proposal than political liberals like myself, at least if one shifts from abstract arguments of constitutional and political theory to predictions about
practical importance and impact of his proposal.
The proposal, whatever one thinks of its merits, captures a certain paradox presented by ―Tea Party Constitutionalism.‖ On the one hand, at
least some Tea Partiers adopt a stance of lamentable ―devotionalism‖ vis-àvis the Constitution, which leads to the suggestion that the original Constitution, at least correctly understood, was almost ―inerrant,‖ to adopt a term
from Protestant fundamentalism.6 This doesn’t prevent calling for amendments, such as repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment, but, of course, that

3
For the record, this is not simply an illustration of what might be termed ―senatorial courtesy,‖
where the convention is that people who despise each other regularly adopt such nomenclature. Randy
and I have been genuinely good friends for well over a decade. I admire him and his work greatly, even
if, as illustrated in these remarks, I believe that some of his particular ideas are questionable and even
―terrible.‖
4
Randy E. Barnett & William J. Howell, The Case for a “Repeal Amendment” WALL ST. J., Sept.
16,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703466704575489572655964574.html
(link).
5
Kate Zernike, Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/us/politics/20states.html (internal quotation marks
omitted) (link).
6
See, e.g., Samuel G. Freedman, Tea Party Rooted in Religious Fervor for Constitution, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/us/politics/06religion.html (link).
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would simply serve to return the Constitution to its original, pristine command that senators be selected by state legislatures.
On the other hand, some Tea Partiers want genuinely to reform the
Constitution in light of contemporary realities, as has been true of many
earlier important political movements. Professor Barnett is admirably disinclined to view the original Constitution as perfect and supports, for example, the Fourteenth Amendment, with its significant transfer of power to the
national government and away from states with regard to guaranteeing
rights. I strongly suspect that he supports as well the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, however shocking each might have been to eighteenth
century sensibilities. Similarly, even the supporters of the Repeal Amendment would scarcely argue that it is returning us to the 1787 Constitution;
rather, it is desirable in order to provide a new kind of check on a strong national government that was almost certainly not envisioned by the Framers.
A de facto ―living Constitution‖ requires what might be called ―living
amendments‖ designed to respond to contemporary realities.
These strains were well revealed in the now notorious fact that the
House Republicans who insisted on reading the Constitution aloud—
coincidentally, on the very day the AALS panel that generated these comments was being held in San Francisco—were willing to read only a bowdlerized version of the Constitution, one that omitted any reference, albeit
indirect, to the shameful compromises over slavery that in fact made the
Constitution possible.7 It was almost as if they were endorsing William
Lloyd Garrison’s famous description of the 1787 Constitution as a ―covenant with death, and an agreement with hell‖8 requiring repudiation or, at
the very least, abject denial if Americans are to be expected, in the twentyfirst century, to have the requisite devotion to the Constitution. One might
defend what I was tempted to describe as the Orwellian suppression of our
national past on the grounds that one should be expected to read only the
Constitution that is operative today and not the Constitution that structured
our politics in say, 1850, when the Three-Fifths Compromise gave extra representation to slave states in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College.9 There might be something to be said for this argument, but one
should recognize that it ―works‖ if and only if one accepts the premise that
the earlier Constitution was in fact grievously flawed and that the present
Constitution is far, far better.

7
Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/politics/07constitution.html (link).
8
J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703,
1708 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (link).
9
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2 (stating that slaves
would count as three-fifths of a person in determining House representative apportionment among the
states) (link); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (stating that the number of state electors for each state is determined by the sum of that state’s representatives and senators) (link).
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Although Professor Barnett views his Repeal Amendment as a way of
returning to the original expectations regarding the relative powers of national and state governments, it is glaringly obvious that the Framers never
envisioned the particular mechanism that he advocates. Perhaps that is because they expected a Senate composed of de facto ambassadors from the
state legislatures (though, of course, without the ability of the legislature to
recall senators who strayed from the legislature’s wishes) adequately to veto
measures that invaded state prerogatives (in addition to whatever expectation some might have had that judicial review would also enforce the federal bargain when the national government overreached). Both hopes have
proved chimerical. The first, of course, is no longer even thinkable, given
the Seventeenth Amendment; the Supreme Court, with some exceptions,
has proved far more a faithful ally of nationalization than of protecting state
prerogatives.10 In implicit response to these realities, then, he would allow
two-thirds of the states to repeal—or, perhaps more accurately, ―suspend‖—any and all federal legislation that the state legislators view as manifesting congressional overreach of its enumerated powers. The states’
veto is ―suspensive‖ rather than conclusive because, he suggests, Congress
could override the veto simply by re-passing the legislation in question, thereby risking whatever political retribution might be attached to ignoring the
wishes of the complaining states.
Why is this a ―truly terrible idea‖? The answer is really quite simple:
Professor Barnett’s desire to place a veto power in the hands of a two-thirds
majority of the states further reinforces the already indefensible power assigned to small states in what I have called Our Undemocratic Constitution.11 That is, the thirty-four smallest-population states (according to the
new 2010 census) constitute approximately 32% of the national population.12 Thus, Professor Barnett would give state legislatures representing
less than one-third of the country’s population the power to suspend (and
10

For starters, see simply McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (link) and Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 (1824) (link), two seminal Marshall Court decisions that put the states in their place, so to
speak, with regard to the ability to tax or to regulate commerce, not to mention an expansive view of national powers. Or, for that matter, see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (preventing states
from enforcing their ―personal liberty laws‖ to provide semblance of due process to alleged fugitive
slaves) (link). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (link); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (link); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (link). There are, to be sure, some exceptions. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (link). But, overall, the
Supreme Court has proved a relatively ―hollow hope‖ with regard to guarding state prerogatives against
national majorities. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN
ELITE 1789–2008 (2009); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
11
See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
12
According to the 2010 Census Apportionment Data, the fifty states have a combined population
of 309,183,463, and the 34 smallest states have a combined population of 98,805,943, or 31.96%. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT POPULATION AND NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES BY STATE: 2010
CENSUS tbl.1, http://2010.census.gov/news/xls/apport2010_table1.xls (link).
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often outright to kill) any and all federal legislation. Professor Barnett’s response to this point is simply to maintain, perhaps plausibly, that as an empirical matter it is unlikely in the extreme that, say, Vermont and Delaware
will ally with Idaho and Wyoming in a revolt against some exercise of national power. Thus, he asserts, it is highly likely that any grouping of twothirds of the states would include one or more large states like Texas or
Florida, and thus would encompass more than 50% of the national population.
Perhaps he is right, but what truly mystifies me is why he won’t accept
an amendment to his own proposal that would require that the states claiming such a veto power indeed represent at least half the national population.
If the veto passes that crucial test, why should we care if the objectors comprise of less than two-thirds of the states? What is so important about
―stateness‖ that it trumps the actuality of ―we the American people‖? Perhaps Professor Barnett would reply that Madison and Jefferson were right
in 1798—and secessionists thereafter?—that the Constitution was created
by a compact among the states who retain their ―sovereignty‖ within the
confederal political order.13 But, obviously, that raises questions that go
beyond a fear that the national government has overstepped its limited
mandate of only assigned powers.
He insists that his current proposal won’t really make a difference with
regard to imposing de facto minority rule on the majority of Americans.
But I would really be quite horrified in the case, however unlikely, that it
did make a difference, so that the national majority could find itself stymied—at least for a period long enough for Congress to re-pass the offensive legislation, as is allowed by his proposal—by a minority of its fellow
citizens. James Madison believed that treating all states equally, as in the
allocation of voting power in the Senate, was an ―evil‖ worth accepting in
order to get the Constitution at all.14 Why in the world would one want to
recapitulate this evil when there is no such present necessity to submit to
the extortionate demands of small states lest they torpedo the entire constitutional project? The added power given to small states is patently indefensible in the twenty-first century, where the United States at least purports
to be guided by ―democratic‖ values, perhaps the most basic of which is
majority rule.15 We are probably stuck with the United States Senate, but
there is no excuse at all to model any contemporary proposals after that
egregious institution.
To be sure, we do limit majority rule by protecting certain ―fundamental rights‖ or safeguarding vulnerable minorities from invidiously discriminatory mistreatment. But it is a notorious truth that there is no agreement at
13

For the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, written, respectively, by Jefferson and Madison, see
ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM 47–57 (2011); THE AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/alsedact.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (link).
14
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (link).
15
See, e.g., Sims, 377 U.S. at 566 (link).
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all on what constitutes a ―fundamental right‖ against state or national legislation per se.16 At the very least, Professor Barnett appears altogether unwilling to rely on the Supreme Court to enunciate such boundary conditions
on national power. Still, he plays one of the rhetorical cards in the standard
tropes of American politics: the necessity to protect minorities against ―tyranny of the majority.‖17
The obvious question, though, is how one defines the minorities that
deserve such protection. Any system built on majority rule inevitably
creates unhappy losing minorities, and the great riddle of constitutional
theory is figuring out exactly when, and why, courts should intervene
against the vagaries of the ordinary political process. Why would anyone,
for example, believe that one should be so concerned with protecting the
political interests—one can scarcely call them ―rights‖—of residents of
small states that those residents should be given a truly extraordinary degree
of protection unavailable to the benighted residents of large states such as
California, Texas, Florida, or New York—who, of course, are grotesquely
underrepresented in the United States Senate? Is Professor Barnett a closet
Jeffersonian who believes that there is some virtue in living in small, rural
states, and that states like Illinois (from which he comes) or cities like
Washington, D.C. (where he now lives) are simply repositories of decadence and political evil?
If he agrees with that argument made by Jefferson—and there is little
or no evidence that he does—then there is no evidence that he shares another important idea associated with Jefferson, which is the importance of democracy as popular rule. And here is where the essential timidity and nearirrelevance of the Barnett proposal is most striking. One can only wonder if
Tea Partiers will be assuaged by such truly small beer, though the opposition of liberals like myself may lead them to believe, falsely, that they will
score a mighty victory should the Repeal Amendment be adopted. After
all, for opponents of federal legislation to win a point under the game estab16
For starters, simply think of the sequence of decisions, beginning with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) (link), dealing with issues involving the rights of gays and lesbians; the continuing jurisprudential and political turmoil generated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and its aftermath; and
the incoherence of the two cases involving ―affirmative action‖ at the University of Michigan and its
Law School, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (link) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (link), where the only thing one can say with confidence is that seven of the nine justices believed that it made no sense to uphold one and strike down the other, but, of course, they split 4-3 on
what would be a constitutionally permissible ―consistent‖ result. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 247 (plurality split
into seven overlapping opinions with, inter alia, Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer holding that the
school’s policy should be struck down) and Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (plurality split into six overlapping
opinions with, inter alia, Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer holding that the school’s policy should be
upheld). And, perhaps especially relevant to the topic of federalism, the Court is bitterly divided with
regard to protecting states against being sued in federal courts. See, for example, Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (link) and successor cases.
17
See Randy E. Barnett, The Tea Party, the Constitution, and the Repeal Amendment, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY (forthcoming 2011).
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lished by the Repeal Amendment, they would have to get the support of a
minimum of sixty-seven state legislative houses in thirty-four states (sixtyeight if one of the dissenting states is not Nebraska, the nation’s lone unicameral state18). At least in theory, one could imagine the twenty-six largest states, with approximately two-thirds of the national population, rising
in protest against the rent-seeking agricultural legislation that owes its life
to the indefensibly apportioned Senate. But under the Barnett model, the
will of two-thirds of our population would fall well short of accomplishing
what less than one-third of our population could do with ease, given that
those people lived in what would effectively be the ―more politically potent‖ small states. Should this really satisfy a populist movement that views
itself as engaged in an insurgency against a near-illegitimate national government?
Consider a far more democratic alternative, which is to adopt a leaf
from, say, the Maine Constitution. Section 17 of Article IV, dealing with
the legislative power, provides as follows:
SECTION 17. PROCEEDINGS FOR PEOPLE’S VETO.
1. PETITION PROCEDURE; PETITION FOR PEOPLE’S
VETO. Upon written petition of electors, the number of
which shall not be less than 10% of the total vote for Governor cast in the last gubernatorial election preceding the
filing of such petition, and addressed to the Governor and
filed in the office of the Secretary of State by the hour of
5:00 p.m., on or before the 90th day after the recess of the
Legislature, or if such 90th day is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday, by the hour of 5:00 p.m., on the preceding
day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday,
requesting that one or more Acts, bills, resolves or resolutions, or part or parts thereof, passed by the Legislature but
not then in effect by reason of the provisions of the preceding section, be referred to the people, [and] such Acts, bills,
resolves, or resolutions or part or parts thereof as are specified in such petition shall not take effect until 30 days after the Governor shall have announced by public
proclamation that the same have been ratified by a majority of the electors voting thereon at a statewide or general
election.
2. EFFECT OF REFERENDUM. The effect of any Act, bill,
resolve or resolution or part or parts thereof as are specified
in such petition shall be suspended upon the filing of such
petition. If it is later finally determined, in accordance with
18

History
of
the
Nebraska
Unicameral,
NEBRASKA
LEGISLATURE,
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/about/history_unicameral.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (link).
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any procedure enacted by the Legislature pursuant to the
Constitution, that such petition was invalid, such Act, bill,
resolve or resolution or part or parts thereof shall then take
effect upon the day following such final determination.19
I select Maine precisely because one does not ordinarily associate
Maine with California, which for many has become a symbol of populist
democracy run riot. Like Switzerland, it is, for most of us, a model of sobriety and ―Down-East‖ common sense.20 Not all referenda have had happy
consequences, of course, but that comes along with any constitutional procedure. There are no perfect constitutions. But one can (and must) always
choose between more (or less) democratic forms of rule. Ninety-eight percent of the American state constitutions (fourty-nine of the fifty—Delaware
is the exception) contain provisions for some form of direct democracy. 21
One might think that someone interested in fettering the national government might find a procedure like Maine’s appealing. But apparently Professor Barnett does not, in part because it is clear that democracy per se is
not particularly important to him.
In that, he mimics most of the Framers in Philadelphia. Alexander
Hamilton probably spoke for many of his fellow delegates in Philadelphia
when he stated, on June 18, 1787, that:
All communities divide themselves into the few and the
many. The first are the rich and well born, the other the
mass of the people. . . . The people are turbulent and
changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give
therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the
government.22
It is almost certainly unfair to attribute Hamilton’s liking for rule by
―the rich and well born‖ to Professor Barnett, but it is clear that he has no
desire for rule by ―the mass of the people,‖ as recognized by Maine’s provision or, for that matter, Lincoln’s famous encomium to government ―by the
people‖ as well as ―of‖ and ―for‖ the people, the latter two of which require
little democracy at all.
19

ME. CONST. art. IV, § 17, available at http://www.maine.gov/legis/const/ (emphasis added)

(link).
20

I pick Switzerland, of course, because it probably relies on referenda for governance more than
any other country. See REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY 5 tbl.1-1 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994) (link).
21
K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1045, 1046
(2007) (link).
22
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 299 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
(link).
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I personally find this to be one of the most interesting tensions within
the thought of Tea Partiers and those broadly sympathetic to them, like
Randy Barnett. Tea Partiers seem predominantly23 to be populist, contemptuous of political elites, including ―experts‖ who proclaim the possession of
relevant knowledge and understanding that are not readily available to those
who lack specialized training. Instead, they speak in the name of ―We the
People‖ and the concomitant ability of ordinary Americans to make decisions on matters that affect their lives.24 But they also proclaim their veneration of the 1787 Constitution, which is about as un-populist as one can
imagine within the framework of a ―republican form of government.‖ If,
though, one truly agrees with Professor Barnett’s arguments about the evils
connected with a strong national government, then why should we stop with
his almost painfully inefficacious Repeal Amendment? Why shouldn’t we
go on to embrace the wisdom of the Down Easters of Maine? Is it sufficient to say, altogether accurately, that it would have appalled almost all of
those who were present in Philadelphia and who supported the new Constitution? Many of them, of course, would have been equally appalled by the
demise of slavery. So what?
Even though I most definitely do not agree with Professor Barnett’s
general views of national power and the need to reinvigorate the states, I
confess that I’m not sure where I would stand if his proposal were similar to
the Maine procedure. It is obvious that much legislation gets through Congress, especially as part of ―omnibus legislation,‖ without sufficient attention or public support. Would it be the end of the world if there were in fact
a mechanism by which the majority of Americans, voting as part of a single
electorate in which each vote would indeed be equal in weight to all others,
could express their views on such legislation? I doubt it, and I can even
imagine concluding that the world, or at least that part that contains the
United States, would be better off.
At its best, ―Tea Party Constitutionalism,‖ especially the wing attracted
to such proposals as Professor Barnett’s, invites all of us to engage in a long
23
This is based on observing contemporary American politics rather than any significant methodologically sophisticated analysis of the deep ideology of the Tea Party movement, which still seems to be
lacking at this time (early 2011).
24
Readers of a certain age might recognize overtones of the 1960s ―new left‖ and its call for ―participatory democracy‖ based precisely on the premise that people had the right and ability to make decisions on matters that affected their own lives. See, e.g., The Port Huron Statement of the Students for a
Democratic Society, 1962, http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html (―As a social
system we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central
aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life;
that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common
participation.‖) (link).
Perhaps it is appropriate to add as well Marx’s great reminder that historical events often take place
―the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.‖ Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm (link).
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overdue national conversation about the efficacy of our eighteenth century
Constitution, as amended, in our own time. The proposal by many Tea Partiers to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, which moved the selection of
senators from state legislatures to the general electorate, also invites a basic
discussion about the degree to which we really wish to endorse a ―strong‖
form of federalism, defined as the systematic protection of the institutional
autonomy of states with regard to important policy domains. No serious
person could possibly believe that the modern Senate has much, if anything,
to do with federalism per se. One might believe that returning to selection
by state legislatures would enhance ―constitutional federalism,‖ though this
would probably be even more likely if the United States were to emulate
Germany, where the Bundesrat is composed entirely of political leaders and
officials drawn from the various German Länder.25
For many of us, the Tea Party is the equivalent of a very sour lemon.
But we should also remember the old adage that if one has a lemon, then
the task is to make lemonade. For me, such lemonade would be a civil national conversation, like the one in San Francisco, about basic visions of the
American political order in the twenty-first century and what kinds of political structures are most suitable to achieve those visions.

25

Bundesrat Members, BUNDESRAT, http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_152/nn_11006/EN/organisationen/mitglieder-en/mitglieder-en-inhalt.html?__nnn=true (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (link).
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